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Abstract: This paper aims at reflecting on the role that we are expected to play as a unit of research in 
education. Starting from the initial definition of knowledge and the confrontation of rationalist and empiricist 
positions on how to access to it, the paper seeks to work on the understanding of knowledge originated from the 
scientific revolution of the sixteenth century, in order to merge in the current context of postmodern paradigm 
shift and bring out what we are expected to do with. What is the main purpose of research? Is it used to draw the 
same conclusions previously found out? Is it used for the reproduction, confirmation and dissemination of 
knowledge already created? Or for the formation of a knowledge that brings something new, that really 
contributes to the improvement of education? 
Key words: knowledge; paradigm of complexity; post modernity. 
1. Knowledge as A Justified True Belief 
The issues related to the nature of knowledge (what is it?) and the ways to access to knowledge (how do we 
get to it?) are as old as the philosophy itself, leading us naturally to the field of the epistemology. However, we 
can agree that these issues were first formally addressed by Plato, in one of his Dialogues, the Theaetetus 
(Bostock, 1991; Waterfield, 1987). Who was Theaetetus? He was a brilliant young man, student of the famous 
mathematician Theodorus of Cyrene. Plato put Theaetetus dialoguing with Socrates and Theodorus. Faced with 
the question “What is knowledge?” Theaetetus started listing a series of subjects, such as geometry, astronomy, 
arithmetic, arts and crafts. 
Socrates then refined the question: “But what is knowledge itself?” The issue is much more complex, since in 
Greek as in English, there is just one word, contrarily to what happens in Portuguese (“saber” and “conhecer”) or 
in French (“connaître” and “savoir”), for example. In this dialogue, Socrates presented a tripartite division of 
knowledge: 
(1) Knowing an object (a person, a thing): knowing by contact, corresponding to “conhecer” and “connaître”; 
(2) Knowing how (knowing how to do things): knowledge of skills; 
(3) Knowing that: a propositional knowledge. 
The Dialogue went on focusing on this third dimension, referring to “saber” and “savoir”. It is also on this 
dimension that we are interested to analyse here. 
Theaetetus continued to reflect on this type of knowledge making use of the Maieutics, which Socrates refers 
to as the work of a midwife who helps a woman give birth. Apart from the association of knowledge to perception, 
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given the argument that a breath of wind can cause a chill to someone who is more sensitive to cold than to 
another person, they focus themselves on knowledge as belief: we must believe in what we think we know. And 
then, he continues to reflect, it is necessary that this belief is true. However quite often, it is proved that what we 
thought to be true is not after all. We must therefore justify such a supposedly true belief. So the justification is the 
third condition of knowledge. Deductive, inductive or adductive arguments are necessary to configure the 
existence of the knowledge we are now writing about. As a belief (1) which is true (2) and justified (3). “The 
preliminarily standard definition is that knowledge is a justified true belief” (Grayling, 1996, p. 37). 
2. Access to Knowledge 
Not everything is as easy and straightforward as presented above. Abstractly speaking, and since every belief 
is based, in chain, on each other, there will be a point where you can no longer go further, because it is not 
possible to scrutinize any other justification in the end. We say here that these beliefs are self-justified, or 
self-evident: we are then at the level of the foundational beliefs, that is to say, the origin of everything, namely the 
myth of the datum, of the pure datum. And then we can question about whether there is or there is not a prior 
knowledge... 
In fact we can only say that we do not know something, if we know something. But has knowledge existence 
regardless the human being who wants to achieve it? Is knowledge just waiting to be discovered? How do we get 
to it then? Or is knowledge a reality constructed by the subject? 
Throughout the history of the epistemology, we have been confronted with two schools of thought: 
rationalism and empiricism. For the “rationalists”, the objects of knowledge are propositional, that is to say, they 
are truths that are achieved by rational, logical-mathematical inferences, by the reason. The only sources of 
knowledge are the ideas of the intrinsic reason, as reflected in the syllogistic reasoning, for example, where the 
major premise is a “kind of self-evident and undeniable statement regarding a metaphysical truth or a dogma” 
(Sousa, 2000, p. 19). In this case, mathematics and logics are the core disciplines necessary to achieve this 
knowledge.  
As for the “empiricists”, what counts are the natural sciences, with their procedures of observation and 
experiments. For them, one comes to the truth by experience, by the senses, although they recognize some 
limitations in this approach: the colour, the taste, the smell, the sound, the texture, etc.., of an object vary 
according to the condition of the subject who perceives it, or the conditions under which the object is perceived. 
Depending on the distance a certain object is from the observer, it may look greater or smaller. For a warm hand, 
warm water will be cold, but for a cold hand, it will be hot. The grass is green during the day but at night it seems 
predominantly black. To overcome this perceptual relativity, some instruments are created, such as microscopes or 
telescopes as more refined extensions of the human senses. Over time, these two groups have struggled over about 
the nature, the origin and the reliability of knowledge.  
The Aristotelian and medieval knowledge was used to view everything that was not exclusively based on the 
reason with despise. The knowledge used for practical resolution of problems of day-to-day had not the status of 
scientific knowledge. This would be an ordinary or usual knowledge, at the level of common sense: irrelevant, 
illusionary and false. 
3. Modern Scientific Knowledge 
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The decline of the idea of the Earth as the centre of the universe has shaken the current esoteric conceptions, 
triggering a revolution in the way of organizing men’s way of thinking and reading the reality. Modern science, 
born with the scientific revolution of the sixteenth century, brought another kind of rationality to access to 
knowledge  
 
“... represented by Copernicus’s heliocentric theory of planets motion, Kepler’s laws about planets orbits, 
Galileo’s laws on the bodies falling, the great synthesis of Newton’s cosmic order and finally the 
philosophical awareness given by Bacon and particularly Descartes” (Sousa Santos, 1987, p. 3). 
 
The Aristotelian deductions started to be refuted. In the Preface to Novum Organum, Francis Bacon (2002) 
shows the relationship between these two types of approach to knowledge (rationalism and empiricism), 
emphasizing the primacy of knowledge that enables action.  
 
“... But if there be any man who, not content to rest in and use the knowledge which has already been 
discovered, aspires to penetrate further; to overcome, not an adversary in argument, but nature in action; to 
seek, not pretty and probable conjectures, but certain and demonstrable knowledge—I invite all such to join 
themselves, as true sons of knowledge, with me, that passing by the outer courts of nature, which numbers 
have trodden, we may find a way at length into her inner chambers” (Bacon, 2002). 
 
In one of his Aphorisms on the Interpretation of Nature and the Kingdom of Man (Aphorism X), Bacon states 
as follows: “The subtlety of nature is greater many times over than the subtlety of the senses and understanding; 
so that all those specious meditations, speculations, and glosses in which men indulge are quite from the purpose, 
only there is no one by to observe it” (Bacon, 2002). Later in Aphorism LXXI, picking up the prophecy of an 
Egyptian priest about the Greeks, Bacon compares them to children: 
 
“they were always boys, without antiquity of knowledge or knowledge of antiquity. Assuredly they have that 
which is characteristic of boys: they are prompt to prattle, but cannot generate; for their wisdom abounds in 
words but is barren of works” (Bacon, ibid.). 
 
For this reason an objective and factual knowledge is aimed at, a palpable knowledge with no interference of 
human values or religious beliefs. And if it is true that modern science raised the man to the place of an epistemic 
subject, the fact is that the same science expelled him from the scientific area, viewed as an empirical subject, as it 
did it to God beforehand. 
This new scientific rationality aims at isolating the researcher, observer and theorist, from his/her object of 
research, in favour of a knowledge the most possibly objective, not permeable by human emotions. It is then 
recommended the “inductive method, which means the use of multiple observations of the phenomena and not 
religious assumptions or other kind of authority to reach conclusions or generalizations” (Sousa, 2000, p. 19). The 
observation of natural phenomena should be free, non-committed and systematic, bearing an attitude of permanent 
distrust of the evidences generated from the immediate experience. 
Against the uncertainties of the reason based just on itself, there seems to oppose, as we see, the certainty of 
the experience, ordered by the following well-defined steps: (1) Problem Identification; (2) Hypothesis 
formulation; (3) Data Collection; (4) Collected data Interpretation; (5) Drawing of conclusions; (6) Confirmation, 
rejection or modification of the hypothesis. 
In this new type of scientific rationality, the “ideas” are not ignored. They configure the hypothesis, not as an 
assumed truth at the departure (the major premise) but as a question to be ascertained by observation and 
experimentation. Boaventura Sousa Santos gives the example of Descartes, as someone who “goes unequivocally 
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from the ideas towards things rather than from the things to the ideas, giving priority to the metaphysics as the 
ultimate foundation of science” (Sousa Santos, 1988, p. 4). In his speech at the solemn opening of classes in the 
University of Coimbra in the academic year 1985/86, entitled “A Discourse on Sciences”, this sociologist drew 
our attention to the mathematization and quantification of the modern scientific knowledge: 
 
“The ideas that enlighten the observation and experimentation had to be clear and simple; because from them 
one can ascend to a deeper and rigorous understanding of nature. These ideas are the mathematical ideas. [...]. 
From this central place of mathematics in the modern science derive two main consequences. Firstly, the 
quantification: to know means quantifying. The scientific rigor is determined by the rigor of the 
measurements. The intrinsic qualities of an object are, so to speak, disqualified and replaced by the quantities 
that could eventually translate them. What is not measurable is scientifically irrelevant. Secondly, the 
simplification: the scientific method is based on the reduction of the complexity” (Sousa Santos, 1988, pp. 
4–5).  
 
And this happens in a context of stability and constancy, in the presupposition of an absolute order that rules 
over all things in the universe, a context in which it would be possible to predict future situations based on the 
explanation of present situations, or provide for situations there, on the basis of situations here. As Sousa says, 
 
“Basically, we were witnessing the affirmation of the nomothetic sciences able to explain and foresee general 
laws: faced with similar conditions, the same results would occur whether here or there, whether they were 
yesterday, today or tomorrow. This universal and timeless determinism made everything seem extremely 
simple and transparent” (Sousa, 2000, p. 21).  
 
Modern scientific knowledge thus assumes a functional and utilitarian dimension aiming not so much at 
understanding the essence of nature, but at knowing it in order to dominate and transform it. 
It is then understandable why all hopes for the resolution of natural and social problems that plagued the 
world were laid on this scientific knowledge. There is an absolute belief that we will reach the final and ideal 
stage of the evolution of the humanity. We have some examples to be reflected on. The theories of Auguste Comte 
(1798–1857) on the positive social state is one example of this general belief, as the stage reached after having 
already overpassed the previous theological and metaphysical states; also the theories of Herbert Spencer 
(1820–1903) on the industrial society, overpassed the simple, double and triple composite societies and those 
mainly military ones, with the understanding of the industrial society as the most civilized and evolved one, based 
not only on its form of organization and division work, as also on the decentralization policy and the idea of State 
serving the citizen, the representative government and free initiative, religious freedom and monogamy, among 
other things. We can also mention the theories of Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) on organic solidarity through the 
division of work, which in his view, would make the individuals become interdependent, cohesive and supportive, 
not by family, religion, customs or traditions, as in the type of mechanical solidarity characteristic of pre-capitalist 
societies, but because, like a biological organism, where each organ has a function and depends on others, in 
society too, each individual would have a specific function, needing others for other functions. That is what, in his 
view, would generate solidarity among men.  
And why not to mention the theories of Karl Marx (1818–1883) on the class struggle as a way of destroying 
capitalism and replacing it with socialism, as a trend towards a more humanistic social and historical 
development?  
These theories are good examples of the optimism modernity started to congregate in his break with the dark 
medieval past, in which everything was due to one single and supernatural cause. It is this modernity that, imbued 
Post Modernity and Creation of Knowledge 
 874 
with a desire of transparency and simplification, as reflected in the decomposition of the whole into parts, or in the 
Cartesian separation between subject and object (ego cogitans and res extensa), denying subjective emotions, 
seeks to formulate general laws at the light of observed regularities. This modernity is characterized by A. 
Hargreaves as 
 
“a social condition that is both guided and sustained by enlightened beliefs in rational scientific progress, the 
triumph of technology over Nature and the ability to control and improve the human condition by applying all 
this scientific knowledge and technological expertise to the field of social reforms” (Hargreaves, 1998, p. 9). 
4. Scientific Knowledge in the Context of Post Modernity 
The “black and white” thought organization to achieve scientific knowledge, in the line of a cause-effect or 
stimulus-response mechanistic and deterministic logic starts, however, being undermined by the recognition of the 
complexity of the phenomena to be studied, in a trend curiously initiated at the level of the hard sciences. 
If Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727) had dared to go beyond the distinction between Heaven and Earth, seeking 
to show that the laws that governed the celestial sphere were the same kind of those causing the fall of an apple, 
was not able, however, to abandon the static cosmic vision of the galaxy—The Milky Way as the entire 
universe—which remained rooted in the minds of scientists until the twentieth century. One had to wait until 
Edwin Hubble (1889–1953) demonstrated in 1929 that, after all, the universe is constantly expanding: the 
conclusion was drawn from the finding of nebulae in other galaxies moving away from us at tremendous speeds. 
This discovery raised the question about the origin of the universe, giving bases to the Big Bang theory 
formulated by Georgy Gamow (1904–1968), a Russian-born American physicist. 
Nevertheless it will be Albert Einstein (1879–1955), who initially resisted to the idea of a cosmic origin, to 
question Newton’s independent concepts of space and time, presenting the idea of space-time as one geometric 
entity, with his theory of relativity (special relativity in 1905 and general relativity, in 1915, this latter adding the 
effects of gravity to the former). 
Gaston Bachelard (1884–1964), when referring to the era of new scientific spirit in contrast to the 
pre-scientific and scientific ones, clearly says: 
 
“Nous fixerions très exactement l’ère du nouvel esprit scientifique en 1905, au moment où la Relativité 
einsteinienne vient déformer des concepts primordiaux que l’on croyait à jamais immobiles. À partir de cette 
date, la raison multiplie ses objections, elle dissocie et réapparente les notions fondamentales, elle essaie les 
abstractions les plus audacieuses. Des pensées dont une seule suffirait à illustrer un siècle, apparaissent en 
vingt-cinq ans, signes d’une maturité spirituelle étonnante” (Bachelard, 1993, p. 7). 
 
They are for instance the quantum mechanics of Max Planck (1858–1947) and the probabilistic theories, the 
wave mechanics of Louis de Broglie (1892–1987), the correspondence and complementarity theories of Niels 
Bohr (1885–1962) and the uncertainty principle of Werner Heisenberg (1901–1976) and many others who have 
brought a new conception of physics which already contemplates the irregularities, disruptions and 
disintegrations, and acknowledges the inevitable interference of the subject in the observation, striking down the 
absolute vision of what is “reality”. 
 
Thus science itself is re-signified, the same way as the access to knowledge, in a rupture with the prevailing 
paradigm, understanding it as “... what the members of a scientific community have in common” and meaning 
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scientific community as “... people who share the same paradigm” (Kuhn, 1983, p. 240). Incidentally, Thomas 
Samuel Kuhn (1922–1996) brings a new vision onto the development of science, by arguing that it does not 
evolve gradually and cumulatively, but through abrupt changes of paradigms. 
This position makes us look at science differently and raise questions on scientific theories: Are they 
descriptions of the “reality’? Or are they just instruments that allow us to better understand the “reality” until other 
better explanations emerge? According to Karl Popper (1902-1994) “all science is based on quicksand”. His 
principle of falsifiability underlines the idea that a theory is scientific only if it can be rejected. “Je les conçois les 
théories scientifiques comme autant d'inventions humaines, comme des filets créés par nous et destinés à capturer 
le monde” (Popper, 1984, p. 36). 
The philosophy of mathematics itself, from the incompleteness theorem (also called theorem of 
un-decidability) of Kurt Gödel (1906–1978), recognizes that the measurement accuracy of mathematics, like any 
other form of accuracy, is always based on a selectivity criterion. Someone has always to “subjectively” select the 
“objective” criterion. 
There arises a new relative and complex order, which spreads from the physical and natural world to the 
human and social world. 
 
“It’s a new order, where it will be very difficult to accept simplistic and dichotomous divisions, I would say a 
Cartesian order divided into reason on the one hand, and emotion on the other, into right on the one hand and 
left, on the other, into man on the one hand, and woman, on the other, into black, on the one hand, and white 
on the other. Rather, we are now experiencing the time of ethical, philosophical, political and ideological 
mestizage” (Sousa, 2009, p. 3).  
 
In this context, the book by Jean-Francois Lyotard, “La condition postmoderne”, is published in 1979, laying 
the foundations for thinking about (scientific) knowledge in the new era we now live. “Our working hypothesis is 
that the status of knowledge is altered as societies enter what is known as the post industrial age and cultures enter 
what is known as the postmodern age” (Lyotard, 1984, p. 5). Being a pioneer in the use of this term and featuring 
the “knowledge” as a kind of scientific discourse, Lyotard faces postmodernism as the end of meta-narratives. 
What does he mean with this? For him, meta-narratives are the major explanatory schemes of the world we can 
find whether in ideology or totalitarian systems of knowledge as it is the case of science in fact. And he blames 
science for this reason. The absolute truths and the idea of science as the “source of truth” are now refuted. 
Even if we do not discuss the difference between the concepts of postmodernism and post modernity, we 
would like to think about the meaning of post modernity in the following terms: rupture or evolution of 
modernity? 
For A. Hargreaves (1998), post modernity is “a social condition that includes particular standards of social, 
economic, political and cultural relationships”, while postmodernism is an “aesthetic cultural and intellectual 
phenomenon, embracing a particular set of styles, practices and cultural forms evident in art, literature, music, 
architecture, philosophy and in a more global intellectual discourse” (p. 43).  
Anthony Giddens, for example, believes that the transitions that have occurred “should rather be seen as 
resulting from the self-clarification of modern thought, as far as the remains of tradition and providential views 
are being removed” (Giddens, 2000, p. 35). He says “We have not come beyond modernity, we are living 
precisely a phase of its radicalization” (ibid.) When Gilles Lipovetski (2004) prefers to use the term 
hypermodernity instead post modernity, he wants to convey the idea that there was not a break with modernity yet, 
as the prefix “post” implies, but an accentuation of typical characteristics of modernity, such as the individualism, 
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the consumerism, the hedonism, etc. 
But either you call it post modernity (Lyotard, 1984), or radicalized modernity or late modernity (Giddens, 
2000), liquid modernity (Bauman, 2006) or hypermodernity (Lipovetsky, 2004), among other designations, what 
is true is that we are living in a time marked by dizzying acceleration of change at all levels under the umbrella of 
information technology and communication, which have brought a new meaning to globalization. We are living an 
era marked by the collapse of the components that shaped modernity. Stability, permanence, security and certainty 
are hardly words that fit into our everyday lexicon nowadays. 
And if we consider the relationship between language and thought, we would say that the postmodern mental 
organization is based on the so-called “absolute relativism”, on the systematic doubt against “universalizing 
presumptions” (Lyotard, 1984), in a permanent questioning of the neutrality and the universality of the reason, 
because “the postmodern world is fast, compressed, complex and uncertain” (Hargreaves, 1998, p. 10). 
In this environment of uncertainty, complexity and chaos, Sousa Santos (1988) presents the emerging 
paradigm through a set of presumptions followed by a justification to characterize the knowledge. Let us reflect 
on these sentences which are titles of sub-chapters notably developed: 
(1) All natural-scientific knowledge is social-scientific;  
(2) All knowledge is local and total;  
(3) All knowledge is self-knowledge;  
(4) All scientific knowledge aims to become common sense.  
How far are we then from the knowledge as “a justified true belief” referred at the beginning of this article? 
How much do we believe in knowledge? How much this empowers the belief? What is the truth in this context? 
And where are the fundamentals that ground the truth? 
Paul Feyerabend (1924–1994), with his famous “Against Method”, brings the anarchist vision of science, 
rejecting the existence of universal methodological rules for considering them elitist and even racist. It is 
interesting to know that this book was born from a project initially conceived by himself and Lakatos, to be 
entitled “For and Against Method”, where each one would have the responsibility to defend his position: a 
position in favour of a rationalist view of science, by Lakatos, and a position against it, by Feyerabend. However, 
the premature Lakatos’s death in 1974 prevented them to successfully complete this plan, only remaining 
Feyerabend’s “methodological anarchy”. 
He asks the reason why the effectiveness of the rain dance or the astrology is denied because they are not 
supported by scientific research. In his view, science is becoming as much repressive as an ideology, face to other 
alternative routes (traditional or not). And if science was liberating, in the beginning, it must not imprison us now 
in a supposedly scientific dictatorship.  
We see that this is the trend that pervades our times. We see that in this new context of paradigm shift, 
knowledge comes to us somehow fluid, discontinuous, ephemeral, unpredictable and chaotic! Boundaries between 
what is scientific knowledge and common sense are not clear the same way as the boundaries between the 
physical and natural sciences and the humanities and social sciences. There are not clear boundaries between 
different disciplines, and even less boundaries between the subject who investigates and the subject/object to be 
researched...  
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5. What About Scientific Knowledge in Education in This Scenario? 
For a R&D Unit, as is the Centre for Research in Education of the University of Madeira, the issue of 
scientific knowledge is of utmost importance, particularly in such a sensitive area as the education, which had to 
struggle against all in the past for its affirmation at the scientific level, firstly in the debate with the natural and 
exact sciences, and later with other social and human sciences. It is not possible to ignore all the signs of our 
contemporary times. 
When analyzing our object of knowledge, that is to say, the educational phenomenon, Sousa (2000) places it 
in the paradigm of complexity (Morin, 1990), with all those signs of the paradigm shift mentioned above. She 
characterises our object of study this way: 
(1) It is global and systemic; 
(2) It is unique and specific; 
(3) It is procedural and dynamic; 
(4) It is uncertain and unstable; 
(5) It is personal and subjective. 
That is, the post modern scientific knowledge in education is total: It is not possible to parcel it in separate 
subjects. Any analysis of an educational act needs a multitude of references from diverse fields ranging from 
history to philosophy, from psychology to sociology, from economics to policy, from methodologies to practice: 
any scientific analysis in education needs a multi-referential vision (Ardoino, 1993). Taking into account the 
overall dynamics of a system, any intervention in one subsystem echoes in all the others. A system is characterised 
by the existence of networks of relationships with “qualities of wholeness, interdependence, hierarchy, 
self-regulation, environmental exchange, balance, adaptability and equi-finality” (Littlejohn, 1982, p. 33) that 
configure a system. Knowledge in education is therefore global and systemic. 
The post modern scientific knowledge in education has to do with a certain situation, certain place and 
certain players, hic et nunc, without pretensions to generalization. Instead of large groups it is interested in the 
study of small communities, a school, a class, a group of teachers, or a single teacher. The case study is so 
privileged, understanding the experience as unique and unrepeatable. It is not possible to extrapolate the results of 
a certain research to other contexts. The sample therefore loses its raison d'être. Knowledge in education is 
therefore unique and specific. 
The post modern scientific knowledge in education is no less demanding in the understanding of its object, 
since it requires a historical overview of the ecological context, from the past, because any situation, the most 
concrete it may be, is shaped by its historical and anthropological roots. It is no longer possible to delineate with 
rigor the precise temporal boundaries of a particular event, or to cut the dynamics of educational phenomena in 
well-defined slices. You must know the life stories to get to the meaning of an educational phenomenon, because 
this is a procedural and dynamic object of knowledge. 
The post modern scientific knowledge in education does not give us absolute certainty or securities that 
previously the impersonal, anonymous and superior determinism did. It is not through the data quantification and 
the measurement accuracy and its statistical analysis, that we conclude on the truth of the facts observed. The 
permanent falsification of conclusions in the research findings is what opposes science to beliefs and religious or 
ideological dogma. Therefore we say that knowledge in education is uncertain and unstable. 
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Finally (last but not least), we argue that post modern scientific knowledge in education takes the subjectivity 
of the researcher as a tool for research, emphasizing the perceptions, conceptions and representations not only of 
himself, but those of the subjects of research, trying to catch the meanings given by them to the observed 
situations, opening the way for methodologies of ethnographic approach and action research in education. We say, 
therefore, that knowledge in education demands personal and subjective implication of the researcher. 
To this extent, we come to the point that concerns us as a Centre for Research in Education: what is the 
ultimate goal of research? Does it serve to reach the same conclusions already discovered? Is it for the 
reproduction, confirmation and dissemination of knowledge already created? Or for the generation of a knowledge 
that brings something new in order to effectively contribute to the improvement of education?  
It is not by chance that the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), that supports this 
Centre, states as its mission the following: 
 
“The mission of FCT consists in continuously promoting the advancement of scientific and technological 
knowledge in Portugal, exploring opportunities that become available in any scientific or technological 
domain to attain the highest international standards in the creation of knowledge, and to stimulate their 
diffusion and contribution to improve education, health, environment, and the quality of life and well-being of 
the general public.” 
 
The question is whether the ultimate goal of creating knowledge for the improvement of Education may or 
may not abdicate of methodological rules, as Teresa Estrela warns us, when she says: 
 
“[...] The weakening or abolition of the validity criteria not only reinforces the trend to ideological 
discourse and the politicization of science as it gives sciences of education a dubious negative legitimacy. [...] 
Moreover sciences accused of lack of rigor, may now be tempted or legitimated to any kind of impressionism 
and abandon any sort of accuracy, since without rules there are no transgressions. 
And this is, in my opinion, one of the biggest traps in which sciences of education can fall. Not having 
behind the scientific status and social recognition that psychology, sociology and other social sciences have 
gained, we cannot afford to fall into an undifferentiated understanding, in a field that belongs to everyone and 
no one and where everything is equally valid, since it represents the unique experience of an individual 
builder of reality and knowledge” (Estrela, 2008, p. 26).  
 
But that is not what we want! We do not want lack of rigor, or undifferentiated knowledge which merges with 
impressionism and common sense, making education a “no man’s land” where everyone, regardless of their 
training, has the right to say their opinion from the cathedra and their niches of power, without any need of 
foundation. When Sousa Santos (1988), to underscore the precariousness of science in the Popperian sense, states 
that “all scientific knowledge is intended to become common sense”, he is not claiming that common sense 
becomes a scientific knowledge. 
The rigor we all desire in the creation of scientific knowledge in our area will rise, in my view, from the 
awareness that scientific knowledge in postmodern education is no longer an absolute and simple, aseptic and 
decontaminated knowledge. Only this way the researcher will resist being a mere plaything of external forces in 
the definition of education. That’s what we want: a clarifying, instead of sticking our heads in the sand, as if no 
winds of change were blowing. 
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